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COMMENT / Judicial Review of Government Boards
of Contract Appeals-Some New Cases
IN JUNE, 1966, THE SUPREME COURT handed down decisions in United States
v. Utah Mining & Constr. Co.' and United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons,
Inc.2 Both cases were on certiorari from the Court of Claims and both dealt
with the degree of finality which the courts must accord to the decisions of
the government boards of contract appeals. The decisions in both cases re-
fined and narrowed the review power of the Court of Claims and in conse-
quence, strengthened the power and authority of agency boards set up to
hear and settle disputes between the government and private contractors in
the important area of federal procurement. The purpose of this paper is to
examine the circumstances and cases leading to these decisions and their effect
on the review power of the courts.
The United States Government spends billions of dollars annually in pro-
curement. It contracts for myriad services, from research and development
to construction and maintenance. With this great volume of contracting the
government has developed a standard clause for government contracts
through which disputes may be settled administratively.3 The contractor
has the option of agreeing to these provisions or foregoing the lucrative area
of government contracting. In effect, the disputes clause transforms many
traditional breach of contract actions into disputes "arising under the con-
tract" which are the subject of equitable adjustment. A contractor who
wishes to take advantage of the administrative remedy of equitable adjust-
ment must conform to the procedure which is set out in the contract. This
procedure normally requires that a claim under the contract be made to the
contracting officer with an appeal within thirty days to the head of the agen-
cy or his representative. The Supreme Court has held that a contractor must
exhaust his administrative remedy of equitable adjustment, unless that pro-
cedure has been shown by clear evidence to be inadequate or unavailable,
1384 U.S. 394 (1966).
- 384 U.S. 424 (1966).
'A typical disputes clause provides as follows:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this contract, all disputes concerning ques-
tions of fact arising under this contract shall be decided by the contracting officer
subject to written appeal by the contractor within 30 days to the head of the depart-
ment concerned or his duly authorized representative, whose decision shall be final and
conclusive upon the parties thereto. In the meantime the contractor shall diligently
proceed with the work as directed.
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before he may proceed in court in an action for damages.4 The contract
clause provides that the decisions of the contracting officer will be final and
conclusive. The "disputes" procedure is intended to provide flexibility in
government contracting so that the government may change its requirements
during performance, and at the same time insure that the work will con-
tinue. Also, it is meant to provide a simple and inexpensive means to settle
controversies by providing administrative machinery to settle the dispute with
finality.
The jurisdiction of the boards of contract appeals has no basis in statute,
but is created by contract and a delegation of authority from the agency
head. The Supreme Court, as early as 1878,5 upheld the validity of a contract
provision which made an agent of one party the arbiter of disputes, al-
though it was not until World War I that a formal procedure was established
in the War Department to decide such questions.6 At the present time four-
teen agencies have established boards to hear their appeals.7 The boards of
contract appeals are not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act s since
the field has been pre-empted by the Tucker Act.9 Thus the finality accorded
decisions of these boards has become a center of controversy. The decisions
of the Supreme Court handed down in June, 1966, were designed to clarify
this area. But before reaching them, a discussion of prior judicial guidelines
would be helpful.
In Wunderlich v. United States,10 the Supreme Court held that a contract
appeals board's decision on a question of fact was conclusive unless fraud
could be shown. The court left only one standard for review and that was
fraud which the court defined as ".... conscious wrongdoing, an intention to
cheat or be dishonest."" A showing that the decision was arbitrary, capri-
cious, or grossly erroneous was not sufficient. The Court rendered this de-
cision in the face of decisions by the Court of Claims which had eroded the
finality which the contract clause provided for and had overturned decisions
which it found were arbitrary and capricious.' 2
'United States v. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1946).
'Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398 (1878).
'For a comprehensive history of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals see Sheed,
Joel P. Jr., Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29 LAw
CONTEMP. PROB. 39 (1964).
v Department of Agriculture, Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, Treasury, District of
Columbia Government, Federal Aviation Agency, General Services Administration, Depart-
ment of Health Education and Welfare, Architect of the Capitol, Department of the In-
terior, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Post Office, Department of State,
and Veterans Administration.
'60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1000-10 (1964).
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1964).
-342 U.S. 98 (1951).
u Wunderlich v. United States, supra note 10, at 100.
" For a review of the judicial interpretation of the disputes clause prior to Wunderlich,
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In response to this decision, Congress enacted the Wunderlich Act' s which
was expressly designed to overcome the Supreme Court decision.1 4 This act
provided that a decision by a department or an agency on a question arising
under a contract was conclusive unless it was ".... fradulent [sic] or capri-
cious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or
is not supported by substantial evidence."' 5a The Act further provided that
no government contract could contain a provision rendering conclusive a
decision by an agency on a question of law.
The effect of the Wunderlich Act was to broaden the scope of judicial
review available from a decision by the contract appeals board. This right
to review which had only been implied before, now had a statutory basis and
scope, wider than that which the Supreme Court had granted. Decisions on
questions of law still had no finality.
This statute, then, set out the standards for the courts to use in reviewing
board decisions. But it left undecided what record the court would use in
applying these standards. Thus the next important issue was the scope of
the trial in the Court of Claims, i.e., could the court receive evidence which
had not been presented to the administrative board. The Court of Claims
determined in Volentine v. Little16 that the substantial evidence test of the
Wunderlich Act was not limited to the perusal of the administrative record,
but that a court had a right to receive evidence de novo to determine wheth-
er the decision of the board met the Wunderlich standards. 17 In contrast, the
circuit courts had held that courts were limited to a review of the adminis-
trative record.' 8 In United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.,' 9 the Supreme
Court again attempted to clarify the role of the courts in reviewing decisions.
It held that the courts were limited to the administrative record in review-
ing decisions of contract appeals boards under the standards of the Wunder-
lich Act, and that the courts were not to receive new evidence but were to
act as an appeals court. Subsequent to the Bianchi decision, there were pro-
posals that the Congress enact legislation in the nature of the Wunderlich
see Schultz, Wunderlich Revisited: New Limits On Judicial Review Of Administrative De-
termination Of Government Contract Disputes, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 115 (1964).
-868 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1964).
14 The House Report on the bill expressly stated this purpose. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 83rd
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954).
11 Supra note 13.
16 144 Ct. Cl. 723, 169 F. Supp. 263 (1959).
11 The court was speaking of the substantial evidence test.
18 Allied Paint & Color Works, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1962); Lowell
0. West Lumber Sales v. United States, 270 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1959); Wells & Wells, Inc. v.
United States, 269 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1959).
18373 U.S. 709 (1963).
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Act to overrule, in effect, the Supreme Court.20 But no such statute has been
enacted.
The effect of Wunderlich and Bianchi was to make the decisions of the
boards of contract appeals, which have no statutory authority, on a par with
an administrative tribunal. But there were several issues left unresolved by
Bianchi, and the Court of Claims attempted to fill in the gaps.
In the same year in which Bianchi was decided, the Court of Claims held
that the right to a review limited to the administrative record was procedur-
al, not substantive.21 If the government failed to object to the taking of evi-
dence de novo, it had waived the right to a determination based entirely on
the record. Since the jurisdiction of the boards of contract appeals rests on
contract, not statute, the Court of Claims in determining that the review
limited to the record was procedural, determined in effect that the contract
made to render a decision of the contracting office final, would not be en-
forced unless one of the parties raised it as a bar.
In National Presto Indus. v. United States,2 2 decided in 1964, the court
went one step farther. There, the contractor had not sought any adminis-
trative relief under the disputes clause. Instead he commenced his suit in
the Court of Claims where all the evidence was taken. Both the government
and the contractor introduced evidence before the trial commission, and
neither objected nor asked to have the proceedings stayed for an adminis-
trative determination of the disputed facts. Only after the commissioner had
filed his findings did the government object and move to suspend the pro-
ceedings so that the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals could deter-
mine the facts. The motion was denied, the Court of Claims, in a footnote,
noting that the government had waived its right to an administrative deter-
mination.
In W.P.C. v. United States,23 the doctrine of waiver was affirmed. The case
involved the interpretation of contract specifications and, specifically,
whether the contractor was bound to supply generators of a named manu-
facturer or could supply comparable equipment. The board of contract ap-
peals had found, as a matter of fact, that before being awarded the contract
I The American Bar Association conducted a survey to study the desirability of enacting
legislation. 16 AD. L. BuLL 1 (1963). Congressman Cellar, on April 9, 1964, introduced a bill
"to provide for full adjudication of rights of Government contracts in courts of law." This
bill, H.R. 10765, was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, but it was never enacted.
It would have provided for a trial of all issues de novo, but with a rebuttable presumption
of the correctness of the administrative decision which could be overcome by a prepondrance
of the evidence. Nothing in the bill would have relieved the party of the duty to exhaust
his administrative remedies.
I Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 802, 337 F.2d 861 (1963).
0 167 Ct. Cl. 749, 338 F.2d 99 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
21163 Ct. Cl. 1, 323 F.2d 874 (1963).
[Vol. XVI
Comments
the contractor had been informed that only generators manufactured by a
named company would be acceptable. It also found that the contractor had
assented to this requirement. As stated above, the court received de novo
evidence on the theory that the government had waived its right to object.
Then the court posed another issue:
.. whether an administrative determination of this character is entitled in court
to any special weight under the Bianchi ruling and the Wunderlich Act ... even
if reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.24
The court held no. Although it found that the board's determination that
the contractor had acquiesced in the government's interpretation of the
contract was a" 'factual' finding in one sense," 25 it stated that this determina-
tion was intimately related to the legal question, i.e., what was the contract
made between the parties? It further held that:
... under the Act [Wunderlich] all legal questions are to be resolved independ-
ently by the court, and under our prior decision subordinate "factual" findings
akin to those made here are wholly subsumed in the larger legal problem of con-
tract interpretation. 28
Through these cases one can see that the Court of Claims was whittling
away from the finality of contract appeals board's decision. In interpreting
its power to review under Bianchi, it had established: (I) that the Bianchi
decision was not jurisdictional, but procedural, and therefore, the right to
review confined to the record was waivable;27 (2) that, because interpreta-
tion of contract specifications was a matter of law, the boards' decisions were
not entitled to finality; 28 (3) that a "factual" finding made by the board
need be given no weight if it were "subsumed" in a legal question.
Since the dispute procedure is designed to settle any claim "arising under
the contract," it is vital to determine if a claim comes within the clause. In
Universal Esco Corp. v. United States,29 the contractor had sought addition-
al compensation under the disputes clause. He filed a claim with the con-
" Id. at 8, 323 F.2d at 878.
Ibid.
•Ibid.
The waiver argument has been used by the Court many times to defend the admission
of evidence de novo. See, e.g., Kings Electronics Co. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 433, 341
F.2d 632 (1965); Blanchard v. United States, 171 Ct. Cl. 559, 347 F.2d 268 (1965).
Even where the contractor sought an equitable adjustment under the disputes proce-
dure, the court would not recognize that the decision had any finality where the allowability
of the adjustment turned on the interpretation of a contract provision, which it characterized
as "ultimately" a question of law. Kaiser Industries Corp. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 310,
340 F.2d 322 (1965).
170 Ct. Cl. 809, 345 F.2d 586 (1965).
19661
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tracting officer, but before the officer issued an order, the contractor filed a
petition in the Court of Claims alleging breach of contract. The govern-
ment moved to dismiss on the grounds that the contractor had failed to ex-
.haust his administrative remedies. The motion was denied, the court hold-
ing that the claim made to the contracting officer did not come under the
"Changes" provision, even though the contractor had characterized it as
such when applying for relief to the contracting officer. In determining that
the claim was one for damages for breach of contract, the court reasoned
that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies since no adequate
relief could be granted by the administrative agency. Nor was the contractor
estopped from alleging breach of contract because of his initial characteriza-
tion of the claim:
Whatever estoppel may lie-and we do not decide whether or not estoppel ever
lies-against a contractor who proceeds further in the administrative process
than plaintiff did, we think that the mere submission of a claim of this type to
the contracting officer is not a bar, even though that official has undertaken to
sift and consider the claim before action is commenced. 0
If the Court of Claims may decide that no adequate relief is available un-
der the contract before the agency makes a decision, the contractor is placed
in a very vulnerable position. If he wished to bypass the administrative pro-
cedure and sue directly in the Court of Claims, he faced the risk of a deter-
mination that his claim was cognizable under the disputes clause and that
he must exhaust his administrative remedies. Since, in order to take advan-
tage of the administrative remedy, the notice of the dispute must be made
within thirty days, the contractor, in effect, would lose his right to any rem-
edy. On the other hand, if he goes through the administrative procedure,
and receives a determination that his claim does not come within the dis-
putes clause, he must retry the whole case.
In Morrison Knudsen Co. v. United States,8 ' the Court of Claims at-
tempted to clarify its role in the whole contract disputes area by distinguish-
ing between the "scope of trial" and "scope of review." It stated that the
Wunderlich Act standards concern only the "scope of review," on questions
of fact in disputes that arise under the contract; it also sets forth the prin-
ciple for review of issues of law. 2 In contrast, the Bianchi decision was in-
terpreted as applying to the "scope of trial," i.e., "when an issue of fact has
been administratively decided on a dispute arising under the contract and
within the scope of the Disputes Clause, a de novo trial may not be held on
MId. at 813, 345 F.2d at 589.
170 Ct. CI. 757, 345 F.2d 833 (1965).
Id. at 762, 345 F.2d at 836.
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the facts thus determined."8 3 The court further determined that when a dis-
pute arises under the contract and complete relief is available under the
contract, neither party is entitled to a trial de novo on the factual question.
But where the board makes gratuitous findings of fact on a breach of con-
tract action, over which it has no jurisdiction, the Court of Claims held that
it may hold a trial de novo on the merits of the claim. Thus only factual
findings made pursuant to a claim under the contract had finality, subject
to the standards of review in the Wunderlich Act. Denied finality were find-
ings made "gratuitously," i.e., where there was no remedy available under
the contract, findings as to contract interpretation, deemed questions of law;
and findings made where the parties did not object to de novo evidence. The
Court of Claims also developed the practice of retaining the question of
damages when it was found that the contractor should be granted relief after
being denied compensation by the appeal boards.8 4
Thus between Bianchi and Utah Mining & Constr. Co. v. United States 5
and Anthony Grace & Sons v. United States,8 the Court of Claims, obvious-
ly unhappy with the power of the boards of contract appeals, had learned to
live with the decision and had successfully interpreted it so that the finality
accorded the decision was not unbearable. In both United Mining & Constr.
Co., and Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., the Supreme Court reversed the Court
of Claims broad interpretation of the review power. In Utah Mining,3 7
the contractor had submitted three claims to the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals. The first claim, sought an adjustment of price and
time extension under the "changed conditions" clause. Although the board
found that there was a changed condition, it denied recovery because the
increased costs had been incurred by a subcontractor, and that the delay
was due to other causes. The second claim was for additional compensation
under the "changed conditions" clause. The board denied the extra com-
pensation, but did allow a time extension. The contractor subsequently
brought a breach of contract action against the government in the Court of
Claims alleging a breach due to the government's unreasonable delay. The
Court of Claims held that findings of fact made by a board in deciding these
claims were entitled to no finality, and that the court must make its own
findings of fact to determine if there were a breach of contract. In reaching
this conclusion, the court showed its distrust and dislike of the boards of
contract appeals.
3Ibid.
" See. e.g., Schmid v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 302, 351 F.2d 651 (1965).
Supra note 1.
M Supra note 2.
168 Ct. C1. 522, 339 F.2d 606 (1964).
1966]
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It is well known that anyone seeking a contract with the Government must be
willing to accept the contract drawn by the Government; indeed, the advertise-
ments for bids so stipulate. These contracts all contain this "disputes" clause,
which makes the arbiter of the dispute in the first instance the contracting officer,
who is the Government's servant and employer and whose prime duty is to be
diligent in the protection of the Government's interest and to require that the
contractor strictly comply with the term of the contract. The transition from
such a role to that of an impartial arbiter in the settlement of a dispute between
himself, or his representative, and the contractor would seem to be somewhat
difficult.88
On certiorari, the Supreme Court posed the issue presented in the case as
follows:
... Whether factual issues that have once been properly determined administra-
tively may be retried de novo in subsequent breach of contract action for relief
that is unavailable under the contract. 9
The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning on which the Court of Claims
had relied, i.e., that the boards have authority only to determine disputes
arising under the contract, which could only include rights given by the
contract and does not include disputes arising from violation of the con-
tract, so that the findings of fact as to the breach of a contract could not be
binding.
In the third claim which the contractor had made to the board he alleged
a changed condition. The board rejected the appeal as untimely, but in do-
ing so remarked that if the claim were for unliquidated damages for breach
of contract, it had no jurisdiction to grant the relief. In argument on this
point before the Supreme Court, the government urged the Court to hold
that the disputes clause encompassed all disputes arising between the parties
to a contract, so that breach of contract claims would come within the dis-
putes procedure. This the Supreme Court refused to do, noting the long-
standing interpretation of the disputes clause by both the government and
contractors. Thus "pure breach of contract claims" were held to be
exempted from the disputes machinery. But the Court held that if a con-
tractor submits a claim to the contracting officer for an extension of time or
for other relief which is available under the contract, the findings of fact
made by the administrative agency which are relevant to a subsequent
breach of contract action are final and conclusive on the parties and review-
able only under the Wunderlich standards. The court went on to say that
88Id. at 530, 339 F.2d at 612.
U United States v. Utah Mining & Construction Co., supra note 1 at 402.
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these findings could not be disregarded in a suit for breach of contract by an
assertion that the primary question is one of law.
In Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc. v. United States,40 the Court of Claims,
with one judge dissenting, had held that where a board of contract appeals
had refused jurisdiction in a case, "or where its prior decision demonstrated
that it will not entertain jurisdiction of a particular dispute,"41 the court
need not return the proceedings to the board but could retain the action for
trial in the court since a return of the case would further delay the final set-
tlement of the dispute. The Supreme Court, rendered its decision in this
case on the same day as that in Utah Mining & Constr. Co.
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals had dismissed the case as
untimely. The facts were briefly as follows. The Air Force had issued an
invitation for bids on a military housing project. A tentative wage schedule
accompanied the invitation for bids with a notice that the schedule would be
redetermined by the Secretary of Labor not more than ninety days before
the work would begin. The contract price would be adjusted to meet this
redetermination. The successful bidder was required to do certain acts to
close the contract and to post a $25,000 deposit. Anthony Grace Se Sons was
successful in bidding, but failed to complete the acts necessary to closing the
contract because of a dispute over the wage schedules and adjusted contract
price. The contracting officer notified the company that the Air Force was
cancelling the bid and retaining the $25,000 deposit as damages. Anthony
Grace appealed the decision to the ASBCA, which dismissed it. The Su-
preme Court stated that the issue in Anthony Grace, i.e., who should make
the findings of fact after it had been determined that the board of contract
appeals had erroneously dismissed an appeal, had been anticipated in
Bianchi. Bianchi had said that on the basis of the record, the court might be
warranted in granting judgment for the contractor, or it could stay the pro-
ceeding pending further action by the administrative agency. The decision
determined that the Court of Claims could conduct the evidentiary hearing
only after it had been shown that the administrative remedy was inadequate
or unavailable. A showing that the procedure would be slower was held in-
sufficient. The court also disapproved of the practice by which the Court of
Claims retained the issue of damages after reviewing the board's decision on
a finding of no liability.
Through these two decisions, then, the Supreme Court has overthrown
the many attempts that the Court of Claims had made to retain wide juris-
diction in government contract disputes. It has left only one area open to
the court to receive evidence and make an initial determination-a "pure
40 170 Ct. C1. 688, 345 F.2d 808 (1965).
"1 1d. at 695, 345 F.2d at 813.
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breach of contract" action. But this area, too, may be pre-empted by the gov-
ernment agencies since the Supreme Court invited the government to ex-
pand the scope of the disputes procedure so that it would reach all the dis-
putes between the parties to the contract. 42
Another area in which the Court of Claims frequently reversed the con-
tract appeals boards also was circumscribed by these decisions. Prior to these
cases, the Court of Claims frequently reversed the boards of contract appeals
by reasoning that the decision involved the interpretation of contract spec-
ifications which was a matter of law and that therefore the decision of the
boards was not binding on the court. But in Anthony Grace, the Supreme
Court pointed out that one of the reasons behind the whole disputes pro-
cedure was that:
reliance upon a few expert agencies to make the records and initially pass on the
merits of the claims properly presented to them will lead to greater uniformity
in the important business of fairly interpreting government contracts.' 3
Since this quotation shows that one of the goals of the Court in holding the
decision of the agencies final was uniformity in "interpreting" government
contracts and the Court in Utah Mining specifically stated that the decision
of the agencies could not be disregarded by an interpretation that the pri-
mary question was one of law, the Court of Claims will no longer be justified
in reviewing the decision of the boards based on the question of law versus
question of fact dichotomy.
Through a long line of decisions the Supreme Court has upheld and en-
hanced the power of government agencies to provide for a method of set-
tling contract disputes by administrative action. The Court of Claims and
the Congress, in one instance, have gone the other way, consistently cutting
back on the jurisdiction and finality accorded to agency decisions. One may
ask why. It would seem that the Supreme Court sees the disputes procedure
as a simple, inexpensive method of settling disputes that the parties may
agree to and be thereafter bound by. This view overlooks the fact that the
contractor who wishes to be considered for a government contract must
agree to these provisions, that they are standard provisions in all govern-
ment contracts, and that consequently there is no free bargaining for their
inclusion. Also, since the procedure is not subject to the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, and in fact has no statutory basis, the various agencies may make
their own rules, in all stages of sophistication, and still the court review is
limited to the record made before the board.
" Supra note 1, at 413.
" Supra note 2, at 429.
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Over against these objections, one can place the fact that the government
has special needs in contracting and that the traditional method of deciding
disputes, which could include work stoppage, would seriously hamper the
efficient operation of the government. Since the whole disputes apparatus
makes sense from the point of view of the government and the contractor,
giving the government the right to have the work continued, and the con-
tractor a speedy and inexpensive determination of disputes, the Supreme
Court is justified in limiting judicial review. Two trials are not necessary.
The facts, technical and complicated as they usually are, may best be deter-
mined by the agencies. And through this interpretation the federal law of
contracts, which is board made and court made, may be developed uniform-
ly. In more clearly defining this finality, the contractor will also benefit since
he will know that he must present all his evidence at the trial before the
board, thus increasing his chances of obtaining a speedy settlement. If the
board finds that the government has breached the contract, for which it can
presently offer no relief, then the General Accounting Office could settle with-
out the necessity of a lengthy and costly trial.
44
If the decisions in June follow the pattern of prior decisions in this area,
there will probably be agitation in Congress for legislation to overcome their
effect. But it is submitted that, given the existence of a disputes procedure,
the Supreme Court was correct in clarifying the finality which a decision by
a government agency must have and clearing away the fine distinctions
which the Court of Claims had developed. Since a contractor faces the pros-
pect of having his dispute dismissed for failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies if he fails to present his claim first to the administrative agency
most claims are first presented there.4 5 Through these decisions, since ques-
tions of fact, even in breach of contract action, must be accorded finality,
the Court of Claims has been rendered an appellate court in the important
area of government contract law. Considering the purpose, and indeed the
words, of the disputes clause, this is the correct interpretation.
"The GAO will consider breach of contract claims, but it has no administrative machinery
to determine the facts if they are in dispute. With the agencies' power to decide disputed
questions of fact with finality even in breach of contract actions, it seems likely that more
breach of contract actions will now be settled without costly court action. 6 CCH Gov'T.
CONT. REP. 90, 014.
"The trend has been toward requiring a full hearing on the merits of a case before the
board determines that it has no jurisdiction. Also, the boards have been arresting jurisdiction
through a doctrine involving "constructive" acts of the government. 6 CCH GOV'T CONT. REP.
90, 027.
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